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THE ALIEN CLOAK OF
CONFIDENTIALITY: LOOK WHO'S
WEARING IT NOW
STEPHEN A. ROSENBAUM
Introduction
Protecting the privacy of citizens is a function typically
performed by government in western-style democracies, 1 at
the national2 or local level.3 Safeguards for the privacy of
noncitizens, especially undocumented aliens,4 however, is a
rare phenomenon.5 Unlike most other countries, the United
States exercises few internal controls over noncitizens. Accord-
1. See, generally, Flaherty, On the Utility of Constitutional Rights to Privacy
and Data Protection, 41 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 831 (1991) on the laws in the
United States, Canada and Europe.
2. See, e.g., the Privacy Act of 1974,5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (protection of personal
information); Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(c) (pri-
vacy exemption); and the Disaster Relief Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §
5121(b)(3) et seq. (authority to collect personal data from loan appli-
cants). For related case law, see, Flaherty, supra, note 1 at 837-41.
3. See, e.g., Fla. Const. art. I, § 23 (right to be free from governmental
intrusion) and Cal. Const. art. I, § 1 (right to pursue and obtain privacy).
See also, Massachusetts Public Records Act, Gen. Laws, c. 4, § 7 & c. 66,
§ 10 and Fair Informational Practices Act, Gen. Laws. c. 66A & c. 214, §
3B (duty of government officials to protect individual privacy and
create individual rights of access to government information).
4. On the use of the terms "undocumented" and "illegal," see, Rosenbaum,
Safeguarding Employment for U.S. Workers: Do Undocumen teds Take Away
Jobs? (hereafter, Safeguarding Employment), 9 Chicano L. Rev. 1, note 19
(1988). See also, note 8, infra, on the use of "alien."
5. See, e.g., European Immigration Policy 297 (T. Hammar, ed., 1985) and Del
Vecchio, The Evolution of Hospitality, 4 Sydney L. Rev. 205 (1963).
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ing to well-known immigration commentators, this practice
has evolved over time and is due in part to the American
"tradition of hospitality and fair play." 6 There is a high regard
for personal liberty and privacy, whether at home, the work-
place, or, to a certain extent, in dealings with government
agencies. 7
Under the "amnesty" law which became the centerpiece of
immigration reform in the last decade, Congress gave undocu-
mented immigrants 8 the opportunity to legalize their status.
6. C. Gordon & S. Mailman, Immigration Law and Procedure § 6.01 at 6-2
(rev. ed. 1992). Despite this hospitality, an immigrant seeking entry into
the United States is not entitled to the full protection of its laws.
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753,762 (1972). Moreover, noncitizens are
still restricted from certain professions, Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S.
634, 643 (1973), and do not have the right to obtain government
information in their own language. Carmona v. Sheffield, 325 F.Supp.
1341 (N.D. Cal.), affid, 475 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1973). They are also denied
certain public benefits and social services. See, e.g., restrictions on
receipt by undocumented immigrants of welfare, medical assistance,
food stamps and housing subsidies. See, Social Security Act, §§ 1614(f)
and 1621, 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v); INS's System for Alien Verification of
Eligibility procedures, 52 Fed. Reg. 33,882 (Sept. 8,1987); and the "HUD
Alien Rule," 51 Fed. Reg. 11198 et seq. (Apr. 1, 1986), enjoined from
implementation in Yolano-Donnelly Tenant Ass'n v. Pierce, Civ. No. S-86-
846, (E.D. Cal., Order of Dec. 19, 1986).
7. European Immigration Policy, supra, note 5 at 297-98. It is this "traditional
American protection of individual freedom," writes Hammar, that
makes it difficult to adopt acceptable policies for controlling illegal
immigration. Id., at 298. Nonetheless, the current public debate about
illegal immigration seems to be converting the hospitality into hostility.
See, e.g., A Welcomefor Immigrants Turns to Resentment, N.Y. Times, Aug.
25,1993 at Al; Apocolypse Soon, L.A. Times Mag., Aug. 29,1993 at 20; and
U.S. Border Crackdown Enrages Mexican Town, N.Y. Times, Oct. 1,1993 at
Al.
8. The term "immigrant" is not used here as a term of art, i.e. a person who
intends to immigrate to another country or adjust her status to that of
permanent resident. See, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(15), (20). Rather, it is used in
lieu of "alien," defined under the Immigration and Nationality Act as
"any person not a citizen or national of the United States." Id., §
1101(a)(3). Many foreign-born and others find the term offensive. See,
e.g., alien, "belonging or relating to another person, place or thing:
STRANGE...differing in nature or character typically to the point of
incompatibility...", Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1986);
and "...repugnant in nature: HOSTILE, OPPOSED..," Webster's Third
New International Dictionary (1986). But see, Nufiez, Note, Violence at
Our Border: Rights and Status of Immigrant Victims of Hate Crimes and
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The procedure allowed those who had continuously resided in
the United States since 1982 to file an application for temporary
residency. 9 They needed to document their illegal residency
and show that they were otherwise "admissible" 10 to the
country. Their applications were to be kept confidential by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).
The far-reaching confidentiality section of the amnesty
statute states that no employee of the Justice Department -
INS's umbrella agency - may "use the information furnished
pursuant to an application" for any purpose other than making
a determination on an application, enforcing the section per-
taining to penalties for making false statements in the applica-
tion process or preparing congressional reports on the legaliza-
tion program. The section also prohibits employees from
"mak[ing] any publication" with individually identifiable ap-
plication information or from permitting anyone - outside of
the Department's sworn employees or designated non-profit
agency contractors" -to "examine individual applications."12
Violators are to be fined or imprisoned or both.13
ViolenceAlong the Border Between the United States and Mexico, 43 Hastings
L.J. 1573, note 9 (1992), where the author employs "illegal alien"
because it is "commonly used" and "reflects the prejudice with which
the immigrant must contend. .."
9. There are also parallel provisions in the Act for granting temporary
residency to certain "special agricultural workers" (SAWs) who had
been employed in perishable commodities a requisite number of days.
8 U.S.C. § 1160 et seq.
10. To be "admissible" means that one is not "excludable" from the
country. See also note 71, infra.
11. See text acc. nn. 56 and 61-67, infra and 8 C.F.R. § 245a.3(n)(1), note 13,
infra, defining individual contractors as employees for purposes of this
section.
12. The only exception is that the Attorney General may, in her discretion,
furnish information "in the same manner and circumstances as census
information may be disclosed" under a provision of the Census Act. See
italicized portions of full section, note 13, infra.
13. The full text of INA § 245A(c)(5) (8 U.S.C. § 1255a(c)(5)) reads:
Neither the Attorney General, nor any other official or employee of the
Department of Justice, or bureau or agency thereof, may-
(A) use the information furnished pursuant to an application
filed under this section for any purpose other than to make a
26 JOHN F. KENNEDY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Ironically, the agency which is charged with the deporta-
tion and exclusion of noncitizens - INS - and which, histori-
cally, has the most adversarial relationship with "illegal aliens,"
has been the most steadfast in asserting the confidentiality
protection on behalf of legalization applicants. 14 Yet, it is an
assertion that is perhaps more cynical than genuine. 15
In almost every lawsuit challenging implementation of the
determination on the application or for enforcement of para-
graph (6) [applicants who falsify, misrepresent or conceal
material facts or use false, fictitious or fraudulent statements
shall be fined and/or imprisoned] or for the preparation of
reports to Congress [on the geographic, demographic and other
characteristics of the newly legalized and their impact on state
and local government, employment patterns and social ser-
vices] under section 404 of the Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986,
(B) make any publication whereby the information furnished
by any particular individual can be identified, or
(C) permit anyone other than the sworn officers and employ-
ees of the Department or bureau or agency or, with respect to
applications filed with a designated entity, that designated
entity, to examine individual applications; except that the
Attorney General may provide, in the Attorney General's discre-
tion,for the furnishing of informationfurnished under this section
in the same manner and circumstances as census information may
be disclosed by the Secretary of Commerce under section 8 of Title
13.
Anyone who uses, publishes or permits information to be
examined in violation of this paragraph shall be fined in
accordance with Title 18, or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.
The italicized language was adopted by Congress in 1988, Pub.L. 100-
525, § 2(h)(i), 102 Stat. 2611. See also, INS' implementing regulations at
8 C.F.R. § 245a.3(n). Subparagraph (n)(1) defines "employee" to include
"any individual employed under contract with the Service to work in
connection with the Legalization Program... "
14. See, discussion of Zambrano v. INS, 972 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1992),
Hernandez v. Thornburgh, Civ. No. S-88-385 (Orders of March 20,1989 &
August 23, 1989, E.D. Cal.) and In Re Nelson, 873 F.2d 1396 (11th Cir.
1989), post.
15. On the conflicting roles of INS officials, see Falkenthal, Comment, The
Adequacy of Review for Aliens Denied Legalization Under the Immigration
Reform & Control Act of 1986: A Due Process Analysis, 26 Cal. W. L. Rev.
149, 161-62 (1989) and note 64, infra.
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reform act, the immigration service has refused to let plaintiffs'
counsel see the files of applicants on the theory that it would
violate the IRCA confidentiality provisions. Although that
response may run counter to common sense, the agency has
been successful in raising this question in a number of judicial
forums and putting forth an argument of strict statutory inter-
pretation.16
The first part of this article explores the rationale of the
United States legalization program, the experience of other
countries in encouraging application for their respective am-
nesty programs and the components of the American amnesty
approach designed to maximize participation through mas-
sive outreach and broad confidentiality. The second part exam-
ines, in the context of a recent lawsuit, the immigration service's
strict construction of the IRCA confidentiality proviso, based
largely on the Supreme Court's interpretation of an analogous
provision of the Census Act.17 Also considered are the posi-
tions taken by advocates for the legalizing immigrants and the
views adopted by the courts. Finally, part three looks at other
arguments for and against the disclosure of information to
applicants' attorneys.
The outcome of the disclosure battles has an immediate
impact on continuing litigation, as attorneys for the immi-
grants continue to seek documents from the Service through
discovery or attempt to monitor INS implementation of court
orders and consent decrees.' 8 Beyond this, the debate forces the
judiciary to come to terms with three competing concerns: the
congressional mandate to encourage participation in the legal-
ization process by mitigating the immigrants' fears of ap-
proaching the INS, a strong American policy and legal prece-
dent against governmental intrusion, and a practical need for
lawyers to communicate with their clients. In this balancing
act, the stakes are particularly high for the nation's most
vulnerable subclass. However, as this article attempts to show,
the United States' social and juridical traditions allow for a
resolution that fairly weighs these distinct concerns. In the end,
16. See, Hernandez v. Thornburgh, supra, note 14, and text acc. nn. 102-27,
infra and Lopez v. Ezell, 716 F.Supp. 443 (S. D. Cal. 1989).
17. Baldridge v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. 345 (1982) interpreting 13 U.S.C. § 9(a).
18. See note 172, infra and text acc. nn. 152-58 and 173-74, infra.
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common sense must prevail over a literal reading of the law.
I.
After more than a decade of debate, Congress enacted the
omnibus Immigration Reform & Control Act of 1986 (IRCA).19
The statute at once imposed sanctions for the employment of
unauthorized immigrants 20 and created "amnesty" or legal-
ization programs "to allow existing undocumented aliens to
emerge from the shadows." 21 In the words of the Supreme
Court, the legalization policy emerged from a "recognition that
a large segment of the shadow population played a useful role
in the American economy, but continued to reside in perpetual
fear..."22
IRCA created a one-time opportunity for undocumented
persons who lived "in a twilight, sub rosa society ... vulnerable
to exploitation" to legalize their status.23 Congress intended
the amnesty application period to run for a full twelve months
and to be "implemented in a liberal and generous fashion ... to
ensure true resolution of the problem and to ensure that the
program will be a one-time only program."24
Experience With Amnesty Applications in Other Countries
The House Judiciary Committee reviewed amnesty pro-
grams in other countries and found that where participation
19. P.L. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359. On the debate, see, e.g., U.S. Immigration
Policy and the National Interest: The Final Report and Recommendations of
the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy to the Congress and
President of the United States (hereafter, Select Comm'n Final Report) (1981)
and Pozo, The Many Guises of Immigration Reform, Essays on Legal and
Illegal Immigration 1 (S. Pozo, ed., 1986). For a history of the U.S.
legislation, see Gentry Saidan and Valdovinos-Hall, Note, Immigration
Law and Policy: A History of Judicial Deference and the Effect of the Immigra-
tion Reform & Control Act of 1986, 27 Washburn L.J. 601, note 3 (1988).
20. Rosenbaum, Safeguarding Employment, supra, note 4 at 1, 3.
21. McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., 498 U.S. 479,483 (1991).
22. Id,. at 482, paraphrasing H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary, H.R. Rep. No. 99-
682(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 5649, 5653.
23. 132 Cong. Rec. H9712-13 (Oct. 9, 1986) (statement of Rep. Mazzoli).
24. H.R. Rep. No. 99-682(I), supra, note 22 at 71, U.S Code Cong. & Admin.
News at 5676.
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rates were low, part of the reason was due to a distrust of
authority and lack of understanding by the undocumented
population or involvement by their representatives. 25
For example, Australia offered amnesty twice in the early
1970s, mainly to nonimmigrants and visa overstayers. But, the
effort was hampered in part by little advertising and lack of
cooperation from ethnic community groups who distrusted
the nation's Department of Immigrant & Ethnic Affairs (DIEA).26
The result was applicant fear and suspicion. 27
Later, in 1980, a "Regularization of Status Programme"
was announced just weeks before the application period and
was operated exclusively by DIEA. This time, voluntary agen-
cies assisted in advertising through state broadcasting, ethnic
media and posters. 28 In the end, the Australian program en-
joyed broad public support and was perceived mainly as a
success. Still, the government was criticized for not involving
ethnic communities more and for devoting too few resources to
outreach. 29
Outreach to immigrant and minority communities was
more central to the strategy in Canada. In 1973, that country
announced a general amnesty for undocumented immigrants
and nonimmigrants 30 who had been in Canada for less than a
year and wished to change their status to "landed immi-
25. Id., at 72, reprinted in 1986 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 5677.
26. Cong. Research Service, Ed. & Public Welf. Div., Impact of Illegal Immi-
gration & Background on Legalization (hereafter, CRS)(1985), H.R. Comm.
on the Judiciary, Print No. 7 at 153. The community groups actually
counselled immigrants against applying. Storer, Amnesty in Australia, 5
Migration Today 6-9 (1977). A reluctant bureaucracy, arbitrary
decisionmaking and a short application period also contributed to the
lack of success. CRS at 153.
27. Storer, supra, note 26 at 6-9.
28. See, D. Storer, Out of the Shadows: A Review of the 1980 Regularization of
Status Programme in Australia, 23-24 (ILO, 1982) and CRS, supra, note 26
at 155. The voluntary agencies were not utilized in actual implementa-
tion of the regularization. Id.
29. D. Storer, supra, note 28 at 25-30, 51-52.
30. "Nonimmigrants" are temporary visitors who do not intend to immi-
grate to or permanently reside in the host country. This group includes
[Vol.4:1 19921
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grant."31 The federal government sought help from ethnic and
voluntary agencies to advertise the program and encourage
applications. 32 The Ministry of Manpower and Immigration
produced extensive publicity, with special attention given to
the ethnic media. Mobile teams of immigration officers were
sent to remote rural areas to assure a high degree of outreach
and regular offices were open beyond the usual business
hours.33 The Canadian ministry did not, however, seek the
volunteer organizations' direct assistance in implementation 34
and some argued that these groups should have been more
involved in the process.35 On the other hand, to accommodate
foreigners unsure of their status and afraid to come forward,
the government did allow persons to appoint a third party to
diplomats, students, tourists, transnational corporate employees and
"guestworkers." See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15).
31. This term, since changed to "permanent resident," is the equivalent of
"permanent resident alien" status under United States law. See (Canada)
1976 Immigration Act, § 2(1)(defining who is "granted landing") and D.
North, Amnesty: Conferring Legal Status on Illegal Aliens A-13 (1982).
32. CRS, supra, note 26 at 149. In addition, Canadian immigration authori-
ties knew that getting agents to commit to the program was essential to
encouraging immigrants to trust them and come forward. Imigration
officers were therefore trained to view the amnesty as an attempt to
"wipe the slate clean," rather than a "reward" for violators of the law.
D. Meissner, D.G. Papademetriou and D. North, Legalization of Undocu-
mented Aliens: Lessons from Other Countries, 13 (Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, 1986), proceedings of a conference of U.S. and
foreign high-level immigration officials and leaders of voluntary agen-
cies and ethnic communities, convened after passage of IRCA. Co-
author Doris Meissner has since been named INS Commissioner. 70
Interp Rel. 1367 (Oct. 10, 1993).
33. General Acct'g Office, Information On the Enforcement of Laws Regarding
Employment of Aliens in Selected Countries, (GGD-82-86), Aug. 31, 1982,
App. I at 7-8 and CRS, supra, note 26, "Illegal Immigration" at 150. A
major poll conducted after the amnesty program went into effect
indicated that a large number of people were aware of the amnesty and
knew where to get information. Hawkins, Canada: The Unintended
Amnesty, 5 Migration Rev. 15 (1977).
34. CRS, supra, note 26 at 149.
35. D. North, The Canadian Experience With Amnesty for Aliens: What the
United States Can Learn (hereafter, D. North, The Canadian Experience) A-
48 (Center for Labor & Migration Studies, 1979).
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initiate an application in order to protect their identities.36
Although the number of those applying was below expecta-
tions,37 the legalization campaign was considered "a relative
success."
38
In France, the immigration authorities reached out to
immigrant and ethnic groups, with a focus on illegally em-
ployed foreigners and their employers, but made no special
concessions to insure confidentiality. The government initi-
ated an exceptional r~gularisation in 1981 to restrict new legal
admissions, curb illegal employment practices and eliminate
"insecurity and marginal situations ... "39 Unlike the previous
French regularizations of the 1970s, the initiative was placed
this time on the foreign national, not the employer.
The regularization was operated by the Office National de
l'Immigration through its capital headquarters and local bu-
reaus.4° Like the Australians and unlike the Canadians, the
French did not allow third party applications; claims had to be
made in person.41 In the end, approximately half of those
targeted actually applied,42 due in part to a massive informa-
tion campaign aimed at immigrants and ethnic groups, a large
mobilization of government personnel and employer incen-
36. Id., at A-22. The immigrants themselves were to come forward only
after a positive prospective decision was made.
37. General Acct'g Office, supra, note 33, App. I at 8. Despite calls from
opposition leaders and immigrant assistance agencies to extend the 60
day application period, in part to allow the legalization beneficiaries
more time to gain trust, the Minister of Manpower and Immigration
refused to do so. D. North, The Canadian Experience, supra, note 35, at A-
23 and A-44 and Robinson, Illegal Immigrants in Canada: Recent Develop-
ment, 18 Migration Rev. 477 (1985).
38. CRS, supra, note 26 at 152.
39. France, Ministry of Social Affairs and National Solidarity, The Employ-
ment Market and Immigrants in an Irregular Situation: Lessons from the
Recent Legalization Exercise in France, 18 Int'l Migration Rev. 560 (1984).
See also, CRS, supra, note 26 at 159.
40. CRS, supra, note 26 at 160.
41. Id., at 160-61.
42. J.P. Garson andY. Moulier, Clandestine Immigrants and Their R6gularisation
in France, 1981-1982, 35 (ILO Working Paper, 1982).
[Vol.4:1 1992]
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tives and sanctions. 43
In Argentina, religious and volunteer groups played a
large part in a mid-1970s amnesty. A desire to control migra-
tion from neighboring countries and fill a future labor shortage
prompted the 1974 amnistia. This complemented the goal of
social integration which had been the impetus for earlier post-
war amnesties. 44 The heavy reliance on church and numerous
voluntary organizations to implement the amnesty may be
explained in part by a serious staff shortage at the centralized
Departamento Nacional de Migraci6n (DNM).45
These organizations helped promote the benefits of the
Argentine program, aided in the distribution of the necessary
documents and helped registrants complete the forms. They
also brought the immigrants to the DNM to register.46 But,
despite heavy advertising in the capital area, rural advertising
and promotion was minimal and the resulting registration was
only partly successful.47
43. Wihtol de Wenden and Costa-Lascoux, Immigration Reform in France and
the United States: Reflections and Documentation, 18 Int'l Migration Rev.
615 (1984). Despite the reduced taxes and grace period for penalties,
French officials believe that employers pressured or threatened many
immigrants into not applying. Gen'l Acct'g Office, supra, note 33, App.
IH at 26.
44. L. Marmora, "The 1974 Amnesty for Migrants in Argentina," 30 (ILO
Working Paper, 1983) and CRS, supra, note 26 at 165.
45. Argentine officials, aware of the DNM's "repressive institutional im-
age" among immigrant communities, attempted to counteract this
image with extensive meetings with department officers. D. Meissner
et al., supra, note 32 at 10.
46. See Marmora, supra, note 44 at 30-31 and XXXIV-A Anales de Legislaci6n
Argentina 278-79 (1974).
47. Marmora, supra, note 44 at 32 and CRS, supra, note 26 at 166-67. Another
Latin American nation, Venezuela, also offered a legalization program,
the only one which was conducted pursuant to an international agree-
ment, the Andean Pact. A low turnout, however, was blamed in part on
distrust of immigration authorities, uncertainty among the undocu-
mented whether they met the requirements and reluctance of those
with legal problems to come forward. D. Meissner et al., supra, note 32
at 12.
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History Of INS Cooperation with Voluntary Agencies
in United States
For many years now, there has been cooperation between
the U.S. immigration service and voluntary or private organi-
zations, particularly since World War II and the onset of special
immigration programs.4 8 In the view of noted commentators,
these voluntary agencies (VOLAGs) "cannot take the place of
government, but may only supplement or complement the
government's role." 49 VOLAGs have performed services at all
stages of immigration, including document preparation, match-
ing up immigrants and sponsors, disseminating information,
aiding in eligibility processing and assisting in procurement of
shelter, employment, medical care and ongoing aid.5 0 In this
latter category, the voluntary agencies have provided such
services as legal advice to immigrants and sponsors, advocacy
before federal and international policy-making bodies and
representation before administrative branches of the INS and
Board of Immigration Appeals.51
Almost forty years before IRCA was enacted, the INS
Commissioner actually appointed an assistant commissioner
to serve as a consultant to the Service and as liaison officer with
the VOLAGs in order to "mak[e] the law enforcement job of the
48. See, e.g., Shoemaker, Cooperation with the Social Agencies, 3 INS Monthly
Rev. 273-74 (Mar. 1946); Bremer, Development of Private Social Work with
the Foreign Born, 7 INS Monthly Rev. 20 (Aug. 1949); Final Report of
Displaced Persons Commission, vi, 267, 293.4 (1952); and Reports to Con-
gress by Interagency and HEW Indochina Refugees Task Forces, 1975-1977.
See also, D. Meissner and D. G. Papademetriou, The Legalization Count-
down: A Third Quarter Assessment 61 (Carnegie Endowment for Interna-
tional Peace, 1988), referring to the INS-agency relationship as "con-
structive" and "healthy."
49. C. Gordon & S. Mailman, supra, note 6, § 5.01[3] at 5-5.
50. See, generally, Rosenfield, The Roles of Government and the Voluntary
Agencies in Immigration, Cong. Rec. A4115, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (June 2,
1954); Greenleigh, Aliens and Foreign Born, Social Work Yearbook 106
(1957); and C. Gordon & S. Mailman, supra, note 6, § 5.03[2]-[4].
51. C. Gordon & S. Mailman, supra, note 6, § 5.03[4][d]. But see, note 62,
infra, on the adaptation of the VOLAGs to the demands of the legaliza-
tion program.
[Vol.4:1 1992]
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Immigration and Naturalization Service easier and more effi-
cient."52
Responding to reports b the Select Commission on Immi-
gration and Refugee Policy5 and congressional committees 54
concerning other countries' experience and the U.S. success
with VOLAGs, Congress included provisions in the amnesty
act to work through organizations with ties to the ethnic and
immigrant communities. Under IRCA, the Attorney General
was obliged to "broadly disseminate information" about the
benefits of legalization and details of the application process
and to designate voluntary organizations ("qualified desig-
nated entities" or "QDEs") to assist in the legalization pro-
cess.55 This was consistent with the approach adopted in Canada
and Argentina.
Congress recognized that the legalization program could
52. Shoemaker, supra, note 48 at 274. There is no longer an assistant
commissioner who has this role, but the government-volunteer sector
cooperation has continued. Frequently, INS officers refer immigrants
and others to VOLAGs for assistance with immigration procedures. C.
Gordon & S. Mailman, supra, note 6, § 5.03[5] [b] [ii]. See also, Oct. 8,1992
Deposition of Emily Goldfarb, at 13, Catholic Social Services v. Barr, Civ.
No. 86-1343 (E.D. Cal.) regarding the experience of local immigrants'
rights coalition in staffing an on-site information and advocacy table at
the San Francisco legalization office and Hing, The Immigration and
Naturalization Service, Community Based Organizations and the Legaliza-
tion Experience: Lessons for the Self Help Immigration Phenomenon, 6 Geo.
Immigr. L.J. 413,444 (1992).
53. After conducting a 19-month study, the Commission recommended
extensive outreach efforts and the use of voluntary agencies to process
applications. Select Comm'n Final Report, supra, note 19 at 81.
54. The House Judiciary Committee concluded that the use of voluntary
agencies might be able to encourage immigrants who were fearful and
distrustful of authority to come forward. H.R. Rep. No. 99-682(I), supra,
note 22 at 73, reprinted in 1986 U.S. Cong. Code & Admin. News at 5677.
55. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1255a(c) & (i). See also, H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-1000, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1986) 92-93, reprinted in 1986 U.S. Cong. Code &
Admin. News 5840,5848, on the responsibility of the Attorney General
to disseminate information on eligibility for and the benefits of legaliza-
tion. Interestingly, the conference committee deleted from the final bill
the instruction that dissemination be "in English and other languages
... ," Id.
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succeed only if "the fear of prosecution or deportation [that]
would cause many undocumented aliens to be reluctant to
come forward and disclose their illegal status..."56 could be
overcome.
Confidential Application Process and Outreach
During the congressional debate, the senior California
senator noted that the whole purpose of legalization "is under-
cut if overly stringent procedures prevent vast numbers of
aliens from qualifying and intimidate many others from even
applying."57 The restrictive aspects of IRCA were also seen as
impediments to successful implementation, to be countered by
"aggressive outreach and administrative credibility." 58 Con-
gress opted for a shielded claims filing procedure, but not the
third party applications permitted by the Canadians.
The publicity campaign conducted by the Service itself
and its outreach to the various immigrant communities, how-
ever, met with mixed reviews. For example, a public interest
advertising firm called the campaign "unresponsive, dull and
uninformative" and charged the INS with failing "to create
awareness and a climate of information about the amnesty
program" or to address the "powerful mistrust and skepti-
cism" of applicants.59 A prominent labor union criticized the
56. McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, 498 U.S. 479,484. For a discussion of
fear of the INS, see Hing, supra, note 52 at 432-36.
57. 199 Cong. Rec. 12,814 (1983) (remarks of Sen. Alan Cranston), cited in
Perales v. Thornburgh, 967 F.2d 798, 813 (2d Cir. 1992), judgment vacated
on othergrounds sub nom. Reno v. Perales, 509 U.S._, 113 S.Ct. 3027 (1993).
Having six months lead time to implement the program - as opposed
to the four months more typical of the other countries - the United
States was considered to have a better chance of success. D. Meissner et
al., supra, note 32 at 2. One federal judge, however, referred to INS'
implementation of the Act as a "moving target," with developments in
the statute and regulations being "rapid and somewhat helter-skelter.
In retrospect, it seem [sic] clear that Congress did not allow itself, the
INS or applicants sufficient time to prepare for the legalization pro-
gram." United Farm Workers v. INS, Civ. No. S-87-1064 (E.D. Cal., Order
of Sept 20, 1988) at note 1. See also, Barr v. Catholic Social Services, U.S.
Supreme Court, No. 91-1826, Respondents' Opp. Brf. at 9 (on file with
Clearinghouse Rev., No. 42,712) (plaintiffs allege that INS' tardy compli-
ance with IRCA resulted in non-issuance of work permits and illegal
expulsions).
58. D. Meissner et al., supra, note 32 at 3.
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Service for not distributing regulations and not having multi-
lingual brochures and application forms available.60 An inde-
pendent researcher, however, took the long view, concluding
that, "[d]espite considerable shortcomings in its outreach and
coordinationwith QDEs, the INS emerges from legalization
with greater capacity to communicate and stronger roots in
local communities. " 61
In the end, about 2,000 charitable, religious and social
groups signed up with INS to receive applications and, for a
small fee, to assist applicants in their preparation.62 Even this
number of organizations, however, was not always able to
59. See, comments of Public Media in California Legislative Joint Comm'ee on
Refugee Resettlement, International Migration and Cooperative Develop-
ment, Hearings on Immigration Reform and Control Act: Implementation and
Impact in California, (hereafter, California Legislative Joint Comm. Hear-
ings) 132-33. (Statement of Stephen Rosenbaum, California Rural Legal
Assistance, July 23, 1987). One RAND Corporation - Urban Institute
researcher noted that the IRCA publicity budget was small and not
always channeled to the appropriate media and that INS' campaign
was often at odds with the efforts of QDEs and community advocates.
S. Gonzalez Baker, The Cautious Welcome: The Legalization Programs of the
Immigration Reform and Control Act 121-31 (1990). See also, D. Meissner
and D.G. Papademetriou, supra, note 48 at 13-15, 18-20 on the media
effort and Hing, supra, note 52 at 438-43.
60. Id., at 48-49 (Testimony of Jeff Stansbury, International Ladies Garment
Workers Union, May 15, 1987).
61. J. Juffras, Impact of the Immigration Reform and Control Act on the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service 63 (1991). In this RAND Corporation -
Urban Institute report, Juffras also comments on INS' difficulties in
getting outreach funds at the district level, recruiting and training case-
handling staff and working with local advocates. Id., at 61-69. See also,
Hing, supra, note 52, at 424-32, for a description of outreach conducted
by INS. Professor Hing puts greater emphasis on the role of the
"community based organization," a term which embraces more than
the INS-designated agency. Id., at 444-53.
62. J. Joannes, D. Warner and J. Biddle, The Immigration Reform and Control
Act Handbook 75 (2d ed. 1990). Almost half of these groups were
qualified designated entities. See 52 Fed. Reg. 44,812 (1987). QDEs
received about $15 per applicant from the Service and charged up to $75
in fees. Id. For an analysis of the positive role played by these organiza-
tions, see, Hing, supra, note 52 at 444-53. One evaluation, however,
compared the success of the newer QDEs with the limitations of the
"traditional immigration-assistance community" in reaching isolated
communities and distinguishing between advocacy and assistance. D.
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meet the high applicant demand. 63
The QDEs' "very function was to provide a buffer - a
confidential intermediary - between the INS64 and the
alien .... ,,65 Congress also intended that the files and records
kept by the designated organizations not be accessible to the
Meissner and D. G. Papademetriou, supra, note 48 at 62-63, 68, 76.
63. One organization active in the application process asserted that QDEs
had waiting lists of 10,000. California Legislative Joint Comm'ee Hear-
ings, supra, note 59, (Statement of Legal Aid Society of Orange County,
May, 15, 1987) at 37. A RAND Corporation - Urban Institute study, on
the other hand, noted that about 70% of the applicants filed directly
with the immigration service, bypassing the QDEs. The study's authors
attributed this to a lack of fear of the INS. F. D. Bean, G. Vernez and C.
B. Keeley, Opening and Closing the Doors: Evaluating Immigration Reform
and Control 70 (1989). But see, S. Gonzdlez Baker, supra, note 59 at 126,
explaining that applicants often went first to trusted QDEs and then
filed their applications with the INS. See also, D. North, Immigration
Reform in Its First Year, 25 (Center for Immigration Studies Paper No. 4,
1987) (estimating that midway into the application period, less than
20% of the legalization candidates had applied through the designated
entities.) North also observed that QDEs were not paid much per
application, were not often mentioned in INS' national publicity mate-
rials and were perceived by applicants as having long waiting lines. Id.,
at 25, 27. For more on the financing of publicity efforts and perceived
problems see, D. Meissner and D. G. Papademetriou, supra, note 48 at
64-67.
64. See, Perales v. Thornburgh, 967 F.2d, supra, where the Court of Appeals
recognized that Congress provided for confidentiality; for QDEs "to
mediate" between the applicants and INS; and for the broad dissemina-
tion of information, funded outreach services and a lengthy application
period. Id. at 813. Upon enactment of IRCA, immigration officials
admitted publicly to their change of roles. "It's like a 180-degree turn
[for me] because now I'm working to keep people in as opposed to
locking them up or sending them away," commented a deputy regional
commissioner in charge of legalization. Awaiting A Deluge At the INS;
Agency Prepares for Law's Advent, Wash. Post, Mar. 10, 1987 at A13. See
also, D. Meissner and D. G. Papademetriou, supra, note 48 at 20, on the
INS' "image transformation" and break down of the "circle of fear"
surrounding the agency. A similar role change had been reported by
Argentine and Canadian immigration officers. See, supra, nn. 32 and 45.
65. Ayuda, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325,1339 (D.C. Cir. 1989). One of the
questions presented by plaintiffs in this protracted lawsuit is whether
QDEs have standing - independent from an individual aggrieved
applicant's - to sue INS because of the injury they may suffer, as the
result of the Government's uncertain or incorrect implementation of
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Attorney General or any other government agency and that the
applicants consent to the forwarding of their applications for
INS processing. The cloak of confidentiality was to cover even
those applications which in the view of the QDE did not
warrant consideration for legalization. 66 The confidentiality
was "meant to assure applicants that the legalization process is
serious, and not a ruse to invite undocumented aliens to come
forward only to be snared by the INS. ' 67
II.
Zambrano v. Immigration & Naturalization Service
In April 1988, Mexican national Marta Zambrano and
IRCA, from their impaired ability to advise immigrant applicants. The
Circuit Court thrice held that they do not. Id. at 1339-40; Ayuda, Inc. v.
Thornburgh ("Ayuda II"), 948 F. 2d 742, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1991)(concluding
that McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr. did not decide the organizational
standing question), judgment vacated sub nom. Ayuda, Inc. v. Reno, 509
U.S. _, 113 S.Ct. 3026; and "Ayuda III," 7 F. 3d 246, 250 (1993) (on
remand, court again held QDEs lack standing). See also, INS v. Legaliza-
tion Assistance Proj., - U.S. _ 114 S. Ct. 422, 424 (1993) (O'Connor, J.,
Cir. Justice, stayed district court order on ground that plaintiff, a non-
member organization, lacked standing because its injuries were outside
"zone of interests" to be protected under IRCA).
66. 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(c)(3). Files and records which remain in QDE custody
are confidential and are available to the Attorney General and INS only
with the applicant's consent. Id., § 1255a(c)(4). See, Reno v. Catholic Social
Services, 509 U.S. ___ 113 S.Ct. 2485 (1993) on the very practical
implications for the applicant whose claim for amnesty has been
rejected. Because of the confidentiality provisions, the Court noted, the
immigrant may continue "residing in the United States in an unlawful
status" as if "the government has not found out about him yet." Id., at
2494.
67. H.R. Rep. No. 99-682(I), supra, note 22 at 73, reprinted in 1986 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News at 5677. See also, McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr.,
498 U.S. at 484-85. The Service, however, completely disregarded
Congress' admonition when it conducted a sting operation five years
after passage of the amnesty filing deadline. With legalization applica-
tions still pending, INS mailed phony letters promising work authori-
zation to undocumented immigrants. This ruse resulted in the arrest
and deportation of those who showed up at the local INS office. INS
Fakes Letters To Nab Illegals, S.F. Examiner, Aug. 1, 1993 at B7. See note
133, infra, regarding immigration fraud by practitioners.
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others - mainly women 68 with dependent children 69 - filed
suit in the District Court for the Eastern District of California 70
on behalf of all undocumented persons presumptively eligible
for legalization who had received some kind of public assis-
tance or other benefits that could conceivably qualify them as
a "public charge." 71 All of the plaintiffs were initially discour-
aged from applying for amnesty because of information they
68. By 1990, 42.8% of all legalization applicants were women. 1990 Statis-
tical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (hereafter,
"1990 Statistical Yearbook") 91 (1991). On the plight of immigrant
women generally under IRCA, see California Joint Legislative Comm.
Hearings, supra, note 59 at 143-45 (Statement of Terry Brown, Wages for
Housework Campaign, July 23, 1987). See also, Chang, Undocumented
Latinas: The New "Employable Mothers," in Mothering: Ideology, Experi-
ence and Agency, (E. Nakano Glenn, G. Chang, L. Rennie Forcey, eds.,
1993).
69. For a discussion of how United States immigration policy has histori-
cally focused on single men to the exclusion of dependent spouses and
children, see Sanger, Immigration Reform and Control of the Undocumented
Family, 2 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 295 (1987).
70. Zambrano v. INS, Civ. No. S-88-455, complaint (April 12,1988). A Second
Amended Complaint was filed on Aug. 20, 1988. (Most court docu-
ments are on file with Clearinghouse Rev., No. 43, 351). Over 900,000 of
all legalization applicants lived in California. 1990 Statistical Yearbook
supra, note 68 at 95. See, Bessett, Note, Getting Left Behind: The Impact of
the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act Amnesty Program on Single
Women With Children, 13 Hastings Int'l and Comp. L. Rev. 287 (1990) for
the factual background of the lawsuit. See also, Falkenthal, Comment,
supra, note 15, regarding due process in the legalization process gener-
ally.
71. One of the grounds of inadmissibility is that the applicant is "likely at
any time to become a public charge.. ." 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4). Under the
precursor to this statute, the first general immigration law, Congress
barred admission to "idiots, lunatics, convicts and persons likely to
become public charges." Act of May 6, 1882, 22 Stat. 58. To effectuate
IRCA's goals as stated above, Congress liberalized the standards for
those who could not meet the traditional "public charge" test. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1255a(d)(2)(B)(iii). That is, an otherwise eligible applicant could who
can show an employment history and other forms of self-support must
be granted legalization. See also, Zacovic, How the Receipt of Public
Benefits Can Endanger An Alien's Immigration Status, 21 Clearinghouse
Rev. 126 (1987) and Wheeler & Zacovic, The Public Charge Ground of
Exclusion for Legalization Applicants, 64 Interp. Rel. 1046, 1047 (Sept. 14,
1987).
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received from INS officials, QDEs, attorneys, the media or
other sources of information. They alleged that the dissuasion
resulted from INS' improper or inadequate implementation of
IRCA.72
Plaintiffs brought an action challenging these regulations
before the legalization filing deadline and moved for a prelimi-
nary injunction. They sought an order requiring INS to (1)
disseminate the correct public charge standard while the appli-
cation period was still open and class members could still file
for legalization; and (2) reconsider those applications which
were erroneously denied. The district court granted plaintiffs'
motion.73
Almost one year later, the court also granted plaintiffs'
motion for partial summary judgment, modified the class
definition and entered a permanent injunction.74 The district
judge reaffirmed his rulings that jurisdiction was proper and
that he had the authority to order INS to begin accepting
applications from individuals who had earlier been discour-
aged from applying because of the agency's illegal regulations
and failure to disseminate proper information as to the public
charge standard. 75
Also, using his broad discretionary powers to fashion an
order for relief and maintain the status quo pending appeal, the
judge ordered that the names of legalization applicants who
were part of the certified class be given to class counsel and to
72. Second Amended Complaint, ' 50-53, 58-59. See also, Perales v.
Thornburgh, 762 F.Supp. 1036 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 967 F.2d, on an almost
identical problem facing legalization applicants in New York State. In
addition, the Zambrano plaintiffs alleged that the regulations discrimi-
nated against women and therefore violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution. Second Amended Complaint, ' 62-64. To
date, the courts have not reached this claim.
73. The court held - and INS did not appeal - that the "proof of financial
responsibility" and "public cash assistance" regulations violated the
IRCA public charge provisions. Memorandum Order of Aug. 9, 1988.
74. The district court affirmed its earlier ruling that the regulations in
question violated IRCA. Memorandum Order of July 31, 1989. Again,
INS did not appeal this portion of the order.
75. Memorandum Order of July 31, 1989.
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the court.76 The government moved to stay this order, citing
section 1255a(c)(5), but the court refused to do so.77 In support
of its ruling, the district court explained:
Plaintiffs are the aliens whose interests are protected by the
statute. Providing the names of class members to class
counsel facilitates, rather than frustrates, the legislative in-
tent of the statute... 78
However, when INS appealed the other orders of the
district court to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the parties
agreed to stay certain provisions, including the requirement
that INS provide plaintiffs' lawyers with the names and ad-
dresses of certain applicants. 79 Three years later, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the district court's ruling in favor of the
applicants. 80
76. Zambrano v. INS, Order of Sept. 20, 1988 at 2. The order granting the
permanent injunction and partial summary judgment contained the
same language. Memorandum Order of July 31, 1989 at 19, affd, 972
F.2d 1122, 1125-26, judgment vacated on other grounds and remanded sub
nom. INS v. Zambrano, 509 U.S._, 113 S.Ct. 3028 (1993).
77. Memorandum Order of March 14, 1989 (hereafter "Slip Op."), affd,
Zambrano v INS, supra, at 1125-26. Initially, the Court orally granted the
stay. Only after it took the matter under submission did it deny the
motion, adopting the arguments plaintiffs put forward in their briefs.
See Order After Hearing (January 17, 1989) and Slip Op.
78. Slip Op. at 6 [emphasis added].
79. Stipulation and Order of August 15, 1989 at 5-6.
80. 972 F.2d 1122. See text acc. nn. 169-71, infra. Although defendants'
appeal of the preliminary injunction, including the order to release
names, had been argued and submitted on May 8, 1989, the Ninth
Circuit sua sponte requested new briefing and argument after the
summary judgment orders were also appealed. See, Order of June 14,
1991. The appeals were rebriefed, reargued and resubmitted to a new
appellate panel on February 14,1992. To date, the names and addresses
have still not been furnished to counsel, notwithstanding the issuance
of mandate from the Ninth Circuit and INS' decision not to petition for
review of this portion of the decision. See note 172, infra. In addition to
the confidentiality question, INS also appealed the district court's
holdings that it had subject matter jurisdiction and the authority to
remedy the government's misinformation and dissuasion of prospec-
tive applicants. On federal court jurisdiction of IRCA cases generally,
see Kanstroom, Judicial Review of Amnesty Denials: Must Aliens Bet Their
Lives to Get Into Court?, 25 Harv. C.R.-C.L.L. Rev. 53 (1990) and Reno v.
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Exceptions to Statutory Privileges
The government's argument against the release of names
was based almost exclusively on Baldridge v. Shapiro,81 a case
interpreting nondisclosure sections of the Census Act.82 Sec-
tion 9(a) of the Census Act 83 and the INA's §245A are identical
insofar as they both preclude the respective departments from
publication of reported individual data, examination of the
information by employees outside the department, or use of
the information, except for statistical purposes. 84 And, at least
Catholic Social Services, 509 U.S. On available judicial remedies, see
Miller, Note, Amnesty' and Affirmative Misconduct by the Executive Branch:
Does INS v. Pangilinan Leave Room for Equitable Remedies Under the
Imigration Reform and Control Act of 1986?, 12 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp.
L.J. 643 (1990). Plaintiffs cross-appealed the district court's denial of a
motion to reconsider the class definition. Zambrano, supra, Plaintiffs'
Opening Brief (hereafter, "Pltf.Open.Brf."), Ninth Cir. at 59-63 (on file
with the author).
81. Supra, note 17.
82. 13 U.S.C. §§ 8 and 9.
83. 13 U.S.C. § 9(a) provides as follows:
Neither the Secretary [of Commerce], nor any other official or employee
of the Department of Commerce, or bureau or agency thereof, may,
except as provided in section 8 of this title -
(A) use the information furnished under the provisions of this
title for any purpose other than the statistical purposes for
which it is supplied; or
(B) make any publication whereby the data furnished by any
particular establishment or individual under this title can be
identified; or
(C) permit anyone other than the sworn officers and employ-
ees of the Department or bureau or agency thereof to examine
the individual reports.
No department, bureau, agency, officer, or employee of the Govern-
ment, except the Secretary in carrying out the purposes of this title, shall
require, for any reason, copies of census reports which have been
retained by any such establishment or individual. Copies of census
reports which have been so retained shall be immune from legal
process, and shall not, without the consent of the individual or estab-
lishment concerned, be admitted as evidence or used for any purpose
in any action, suit, or other judicial or administrative proceeding.
84. But see, discussion accompanying note 104, infra.
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one district court found Baldridge "very instructive" precisely
because of the identical statutory language. 85
In examining statutorily created privileges protecting con-
fidential information, courts have divided the laws into three
categories. 86 The first type of statute expressly immunizes
documents from disclosure in judicial proceedings and may
result in a complete bar to discovery.87 The second type pro-
vides that confidential reports must be furnished to a request-
ing court.88 The third category is composed of legislation, such
as the IRCA confidentiality proviso, which bars disclosure
without specifying from whom the information is to be with-
held.
Where there is no express language prohibiting disclosure
in judicial proceedings, it is well established that laws preclud-
ing general publications do not also bar judicial discovery. In
Freeman v. Seligson,89 the Court of Appeals reviewed a section
of the Commodity Exchange Act under which the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission may not publicly disclose or
"publish" business transactions or market positions of any
person, trade secrets or names of customers. 90 The court held
85. Hernandez v. Thornburgh (Order of August 23, 1989, "Hernandez II"),
supra, note 14. See text acc. nn. 102-118, infra, for an explanation of the
two decisions in this case. But, Hernandez II also states forcefully that an
independent statutory analysis must be undertaken. Id. at 6, citing
Cervantez v. Sullivan, 719 F.Supp. 899, 909-10 (E.D. Cal. 1989) and
Catholic Social Services v. Meese, 685 F.Supp. 1149, 1152 (E.D. Cal. 1988).
See also, Lopez v. Ezell, 716 F.Supp. at 445, where the court also under-
took an analysis of the confidentiality provision affecting applicants for
the IRCA agricultural worker legalization.
86. Ass'n for Women in Science v. Califano, 566 F.2d 339,347 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
87. See e.g., 45 U.S.C. § 41 (railroad accident investigations); 49 U.S.C. §
1441(e) (Federal Aviation Act records). See also, St. Regis Paper Co. v.
United States, 368 U.S. 208, 218 (1961).
88. See e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1202(f) (State Department visa records); 38 U.S.C. §
5701 (Department of Veterans Affairs records). See also, Policy State-
ment - Confidentiality, note 134, infra.
89. 405 F.2d 1326, 1348 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
90. 7 U.S.C. § 12(a) reads, in relevant part:
For the efficient execution of...this chapter, and in order to
provide information for the use of Congress, the Commission
may make such investigations as it deems necessary.. .and
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that "limited disclosure in judicial proceedings, carefully cur-
tained by judicious use of protective orders ... is not a publishing
barred by th[at] section." 91 The same circuit has "refused to
infer" any privilege against court-ordered disclosure from
"congressional silence." 92
The one critical distinction between the IRCA and Census
Act nondisclosure sections is that the latter specifically states:
Copies of census reports ... shall be immune from legal
process, and shall not, without the consent of the indi-
vidual or establishment concerned, be admitted as evi-
dence or used for any purpose in any action, suit or other
judicial or administrative proceeding.93
This proviso was added by Congress following St. Regis
Paper Co. v. United States,94 where the Supreme Court held that
a respondent's copies of census reports were not privileged
from court-ordered production, noting that a statute granting
a privilege is to be strictly construed so as "to avoid a construc-
tion that would suppress otherwise competent evidence ..."95
The high court also observed that "when Congress has
may publish... the results of any such investigation and such
general statistical information gathered therefrom as it deems
of interest to the public:.., except the Commission may not
publish data and information that would separately disclose
the business transactions or market positions of any person
and trade secrets or names of customers....
See supra, note 83 for text of the Census Act subsection restricting
publications.
91. Freeman, 405 F. 2d at 1348. [emphasis added].
92. Laxalt v. McClatchy, 809 F.2d 885,889 (D.C. Cir. 1987), (in suit by plaintiff
against newspaper under the Privacy Act, court was guided by Com-
modity Exchange Act's publication ban under which Congress did not
explicitly create qualified privilege from discovery), cited with ap-
proval in Zambrano v. INS (E.D. Cal., Slip Op. at 5). See also, Friedman v.
Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 738 F.2d 1336, 1344 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(notwithstanding statutory ban on publication of agency investigative
files, Commodity Futures Trading Commission is not completely ex-
empt from subpoena served in context of court-supervised discovery).
93. 13 U.S.C. §9(a).
94. 368 U.S. 208 (1961).
95. Id., at 218.
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intended like reports not to be subject to compulsory process it
has said so," as when it legislated that accident reports pre-
pared by regulated common carriers not be admitted as evi-
dence or used for any other purpose in suits or actions arising
out of the accidents.96
Section 245A(c)(5) of the Immigration & Nationality Act9 7
does not contain language explicitly prohibiting court-ordered
disclosure by INS nor did Congress supply the requisite legis-
lative intent. This is a strong indication that the legislators did
not intend to preclude court-ordered production of informa-
tion from legalization applications, since a post-St. Regis Con-
gress knew the words to use to proscribe review of applicant
information in the course of litigation.
In a very brief opinion, the Eleventh Circuit concluded just
that. In re Nelson98 holds that there is no immunity from
discovery by counsel for the legalization applicants.99 The
court denied INS' writ of mandamus reviewing discovery
orders in a lawsuit which challenged the procedures for adju-
dicating temporary residency claims filed by special agricul-
tural workers.100 INS, however, has dismissed Nelson as erro-
neous for its failure to consider Baldridge and for its lack of
independent statutory analysis. 101
96. Id., citing 45 U.S.C. § 41, supra, note 87 (railroad accident reports to
Secretary of Transportation not to be admitted as evidence or used in
any action for damages) and 49 U.S.C. § 320(f) (similar statute regarding
reports by motor carriers to Interstate Commerce Commission)(since
revised and recodified at 49 U.S.C. § 504(f)).
97. 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(c)(5).
98. Supra, note 14.
99. Id., at 1397 (quoting St. Regis Paper Co., 368 U.S. at 218 and Freeman, 405
F.2d at 1351).
100.Haitian Refugee Center v. Nelson, Civ. No. 88-1066 (S.D. Fla., Orders of
Oct. 5, 1988 and Nov. 22, 1988). The SAW program, see supra, note 9,
with different eligibility requirements from the legalization program,
had almost identical processing and adjudication procedures and
nondisclosure provisions. See 8 U.S.C. § 1160(b)(6). For the factual
record and claims raised in this suit, see 694 F.Supp. 864 (S.D. Fla.), affd,
872 F.2d 1555 (11th Cir.), affd sub nom. McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center,
498 U.S. 479.
101. Zambrano, supra, Defendants' Opening Brief (hereafter, "Def.Open.Brf."),
Ninth Cir. at note 14.
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The Baldridge analogy played a much greater role in an-
other challenge to the IRCA eligibility requirements. In
Hernandez v. Thornburgh ("Hernandez I")102, the court was not
convinced by the argument that Congress' omission of lan-
guage in IRCA which expressly immunized information from
legal process - as it did in the Census Act - meant the
legalization documents could be turned over to plaintiffs.10 3
Instead, it saw the immunization in the Census Act as an
attempt to restrict access to copies of reports held by third-party,
non-government entities. 10 4 Plaintiffs' lawyers in Hernandez had
requested documents in discovery for those applicants whose
claims, they argued, were improperly denied. 10 5 They wanted
to see the legalization applications, the adjudicators' worksheets
102.Order of March 20,1989, supra, note 14. Scholars and litigators alike are
hampered in their review of cases addressing the confidentiality issue.
The peculiarities of judicial publication have it that a very short analysis
by one court may be published, viz., In re Nelson and Zambrano v. INS
(9th Cir.), while more lengthy memorandum opinions by another court,
viz. Hernandez I, Hernandez II and Zambrano (E.D. Cal.), are not.
103.Hernandez I at 5.
104.The immunization provisions were adopted after the Supreme Court's
ruling in St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. (See also, supra, text
acc. nn. 94-95). The Hernandez I opinion states, however, that this
conclusion is based on "one reading of dicta" in St. Regis and that
immunization of the government's reports was not "squarely ad-
dressed" in that case. Hernandez I at 6. In Baldridge, the parties seeking
the allegedly confidential raw census data were neither the surveyed
respondents nor federal investigatory agencies. Rather, they were local
government officials who wanted the information to substantiate a
census undercount that was detrimental to their ability to receive public
funds. Id. at note 12. See also, Hernandez II at note 3.
105. This suit challenged the INS' implementation of 8U.S.C. §§ 1255a(g)(2)(A)
and (C), which required the Attorney General to specify periods of
absence from the United States that would disrupt the continuous
residency needed to qualify for legalization. Plaintiffs alleged that the
INS rule, 8 C.F.R. §§ 245a.1(c)(1)(i) and (h), did not allow for a waiver for
those whose absences exceeded a fixed number of days and that the
"emergent reasons" exception was ill defined. Complaint, 4, 5.
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and recommendations to the higher INS administrative units, 10 6
the denial notices, notices of appeal and other documents
relied on in denying the applications. The government objected
to production of these documents, in part because it would
violate the confidentiality provisions.10 7
The chief magistrate 10 8 agreed and denied plaintiffs' mo-
tion to compel.10 9 The Court noted that the statute and legisla-
tive history 1 0° were silent about use of information in a judicial
proceeding, but was heavily persuaded by the reasoning in
Baldridge,111 given the similarity of the Census Act language
and its purpose "to encourage public participation and main-
tain public confidence... "112
The only solace the magistrate's order gave to plaintiffs
was its suggestion that the privilege from discovery could be
waived by the applicants. Plaintiffs had not, however, made
this argument and were probably barred from doing so, the
106.This includes the Regional "Processing Facility," since renamed "Ser-
vice Center," of which there are four throughout the country, and the
Legalization Appeals Unit (LAU), the only level of administrative
review permitted under IRCA. See, 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.1(s), 103.3(a)(2) and
8 U.S.C. § 1255a(f)(3).
107.The government also argued that the discovery was an improper
attempt to monitor the activity of a government agency. Hernandez I at
2.
108.The term magistrate, used in the body of the Hernandez opinions, was
changed to magistrate judge in 1990. Pub. L. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5117, 28
U.S.C. § 631 (note).
109.Hernandez L
110.See supra, text acc. nn. 54-58.
111.Supra, note 17. The Court did recognize that while the census informa-
tion sought in Baldridge, i.e. vacant addresses, was seemingly inconse-
quential, it was nonetheless protected from disclosure. Hernandez I at
note 3.
112.Hernandez I at 5, citing Baldridge, 455 U.S. at 354. The public participation
and confidence which Congress sought to foster in the recording and
release of census data is in fact very different from that involved in the
legalization process. INS similarly quotes out of context from the
legislative history when it asserts that the need for "open communica-
tion" bars disclosure of applicant information. See text acc. nn. 146-51,
infra.
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Court reasoned, absent certification of a class. 113
On reconsideration of the discovery ruling, "Hernandez
II," the district judge upheld the order in only a very limited
way. First, the court held that the pre-1988 language of the
confidentiality statute did not yield a plain meaning on this
question insofar as it did not address whether redacted appli-
cation information could be furnished by INS.114 Second, while
it did find the amendment made Baldridge controlling on INS
disclosure,115 the court held that material which is not "raw
data," such as "bureaucrats' evaluations" of the applications-
contained in the worksheets, notices and other INS-generated
documents - could be released to plaintiffs without violating
any privilege.116 Having affirmed in part and denied in part,
the court remanded the matter to the magistrate. 117
Hernandez II also subscribes to the view that Baldridge relies
on the peculiar legislative history of the Census Act and implies
that its holding should not be grafted whole onto other stat-
utes.118 Dictum in Baldridge suggests the Supreme Court was
unwilling to second-guess Congress' long experience with the
census process by interpreting the confidentiality provisions
more liberally. There have been many amendments to the Act
on this subject for well over a century. 119
113.Hernandez I at note 3. A motion for class certification had been denied
previously. Id.
114.Order of August 23, 1989, Hernandez II, at 7. See supra, note 85 for the
court's view of the importance of an independent statutory analysis.
115.Id., at 8. See text acc. note 127, infra. In applying Baldridge, the district
judge took explicit exception to the earlier conclusion reached by his
colleague on the same court, the author of the unpublished Zambrano
order. Hernandez II at 6.
116.Id., at 9.
117.Id., at 9-10.
118.Id., at 8.
119.As early as 1840, confidentiality in the census taking was a concern of
Congress. Baldridge, 455 U.S. at note 11. Moreover, since 1879, Congress
has sought on several occasions to expressly protect the actual census
data collected as well as the names of the individual respondents. The
language of the Act has been amended repeatedly to safeguard privacy.
In 1976, the prohibition on disclosing information "reported by, or on
behalf of, any particular respondent" was added to § 8(b). At the same
time, state and municipal officials - who, like the Baldridge plaintiffs,
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Effect of Technical Amendments On
Baldridge Interpretation
The INS has also argued that the amendments to IRCA 120
were proof that Congress intended the disclosure of informa-
tion to be guided by Baldridge, because they provide that the
Attorney General may furnish information "in the same man-
ner and circumstances as census information may be dis-
closed" under section 8 of the Census Act.121 There is no
legislative history to reveal the congressional thinking in the
adoption of the added language, part of a large number of so-
called technical amendments, 122 but it is nonetheless an ob-
stacle in efforts to distinguish the two laws.
The Zambrano plaintiffs had two rebuttals on this point:
First, the section of the Census Act referred to is section 8123
have complained of census undercounts - have also seen their already
limited access to data restricted further. Id., at 356-58. See note 123, infra,
for full text of § 8(b).
120. See subsection C, the italicized language in supra, note 13.
121.Def.Open.Brf., Ninth Cir. at 35. See note 123, infra for text of § 8.
122.Pub. L. 100-525, § 2(h)(i), 102 Stat. 2611. See text acc. note 127, infra,
regarding congressional intent. The regulations were accordingly
amended in 1989 with language adopted verbatim from the statute. 8
C.F.R. § 245a.3(t)(4)(iv).
123.13 U.S.C. § 8 states, in relevant part:
(a) The Secretary [of Commerce] may, upon written request,
furnish to any respondent, or to the heir, successor, or autho-
rized agent of such respondent, authenticated transcripts or
copies of reports (or portions thereof) containing information
furnished by, or on behalf of, such respondent in connection
with the surveys and census provided for in this title,[upon
payment of costs].
(b) Subject to the limitations contained in sections 6(c)[where
possible, Secretary shall acquire and use information already
available from private persons or agencies or other govern-
ment agencies] and 9 [see supra, note 83]..., the Secretary may
furnish tabulations and other statistical materials which do
not disclose the information reported by, or on behalf of, any
particular respondent, and may make special statistical com-
pilations and surveys, for departments, agencies, and estab-
lishments of the Federal Government [and other levels of
government], or other public and private persons and agen-
cies, upon payment of the actual or estimated cost of such
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not section 9(a), the latter being the analogue to the confidenti-
ality section of the Immigration and Nationality Act.12 4 Section
8 contains provisions for furnishing information to surveyed
respondents and their heirs and agents, and also allows the
Commerce Secretary to make statistical compilations and sur-
veys for public and non-profit agencies without reference to
any particular respondent. A common sense reading of the
1988 IRCA amendments, therefore, is that Congress intended
to facilitate mere statistical and aggregate reporting, as in the
required legalization reports, or the kinds of data spelled out in
minute detail in section 8 of the Census Act. 125
Second, the amendment's authority to furnish informa-
tion begins with the words "except that the Attorney General
may provide ..."126 which must be read in contrast to the very
restrictive language on use of legalization applicant informa-
tion that immediately precedes this clause.
The Zambrano courts never reached the meaning of the
amendment, but it was addressed in Hernandez II, with an
interpretation unfavorable to the immigrants and their law-
yers. The latter court reasoned that Congress, which must be
presumed to be familiar with statutory construction, had incor-
porated by reference the standards of the Census Act in the
1988 amendment. By doing so, Congress made "specific refer-
ence" to the "gloss" given the census statute in Baldridge.
Therefore, the reasoning in Baldridge, according to Hernandez II,
work. In the case of nonprofit agencies or organizations, the
Secretary may engage in joint statistical projects [if lawfully
authorized and the costs are shared equitably,] as determined
by the Secretary.
(c) In no case shall information furnished under this section be
used to the detriment of any respondent or other person to
whom such information relates, except in the prosecution of
alleged violations of this title. ***
124.§ 245A(c)(5); 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(c)(5).
125.This interpretation is bolstered by the fact that the text mandating
statistical and demographic reports to Congress was added to IRCA at
the same time as the reference to the Census Act "furnishing of informa-
tion" procedures. It is worth noting that the identical SAW confidenti-
ality section, 1160(b)(6), (see supra, note 9) was not similarly amended.
126.8 U.S.C. § 1255a(c)(5)(C). [Emphasis added].
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should control the interpretation of IRCA.127
III.
Beyond Baldridge, the opposing parties have debated the
public policy behind the disclosure proviso, whether strict
liability in fact operates against INS in its implementation,
whether certain edited information can be released by the
agency and what duties the immigrants' lawyers owe to their
clients in litigation.
Disclosure to Whom
Immigrants' advocates have argued that the congressional
intent was not grounded in concern for disclosure per se, but
disclosure to the "wrong" parties.128 The objective was to
protect legalization applicants from abuses by overzealous INS
officials, not to insulate the agency from court-ordered disclo-
sure in an action brought by applicants alleging a policy which
denied them an opportunity to have their claims adjudicated in
accordance with IRCA. This "is not so much a confidentiality
provision as it is a prohibition of government use of the informa-
tion to prosecute, deport or otherwise penalize aliens who
come forward seeking legalization ..."12F
Relying on the statute's fines and/or prison terms meted
out to violators, INS has argued that Justice Department em-
ployees are "strictly liable" for any disclosure of names or
identifying information.130 But, the statute does permit the
disclosure of application information where needed to insti-
127.Hernandez II at 9. The court, nevertheless, found a way to distinguish
Baldridge for much of the applicant information sought by plaintiffs. See
supra, text acc. nn. 115-17.
128.See, e.g., Zambrano, supra, Pltf.Open.Brf., Ninth Cir., at 48. In fact, the
IRCA confidentiality clauses were intended to shield the information
from "the Attorney General or any other government entity." H.R. Rep.
99-682(I) supra, 73 reprinted in 1986 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
5677.
129.Slip Op. at 6 [emphasis in original].
130.Zambrano, supra, Def.Open.Brf., Ninth Cir. at note 13. The government
asserts that Congress has included no language in the statute "to reflect
that 'intent' plays any role in the imposition of sanctions." Id. See also
United States v. Hernandez, 913 F. 2d 1506, 1513 (10th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. __ 111 S. Ct. 1111 (1991) (reversing district court ruling
that fact of filing application may be disclosed, but not its contents).
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tute deportation or criminal prosecution' 3' of applicants who
submit fraudulent applications. 132 The INS General Counsel
has also decided that the fraud exception applies to third
parties who aid and abet the commission of fraud.133
The alleged strict liability is also tempered by a more
flexible departmental interpretation. INS' own internal policy
statement, for example, anticipates some releases of informa-
tion from the legalization application files to third parties
outside the Department of Justice, pursuant to Freedom of
131.See, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(c)(5)(A) and 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(t)(4). In 1988, INS
withdrew its authority to commence deportation proceedings in in-
stances where the U.S. Attorney has decided against prosecution for a
fraudulent legalization application. 53 Fed. Reg. 23,381-23,382 (June 22,
1988). The Service recognizes that it cannot use the legalization informa-
tion to support a deportability charge where there is no evidence of
fraud. INS, Office of General Counsel, "Legal Opinion: Use of legaliza-
tion files as evidence in rescission and deportation proceedings," (Dec.
6, 1989). But see, Declaration of Margaret Stevenson of Dec. 17, 1992,
Naranjo-Aguilera v. U.S. INS, No. S-91-1462 (E.D. Cal.) (deportation
proceedings commenced against undocumented client on same date as
letter issued denying SAW status) (on file with the author) and n. 138,
infra. But see, U.S. v. Hernandez, 913 F. 2d at 1512 (disclosure of
application permitted in prosecution for federal criminal violations
unrelated to deportation).
132.In its own interpretation of the fraud exception, the Service explains
that those who attempted to commit fraud while applying for legaliza-
tion (e.g., by submitting false documents or making false statements)
would lose the confidentiality protection, whereas those who admitted
to past false statements or use of false names and Social Security
numbers would be protected by § 1255a(c)(5). See, Letter of May 11,
1987 from INS Associate Comm'r Richard Norton to American Ass'n of
Immigration Lawyers (AILA) Executive Director Warren Leiden, re-
printed in 64 Interp. Rel. 711,733-34 (June 8, 1987). See also, § 544 of the
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649,104 Stat. 4978,8 U.S.C. §§
1324c(a) and (d)(3), setting out civil monetary penalties of up to $500 for,
inter alia, each creation, use, possession, acceptance or receipt of fraudu-
lent or false documents.
133.See, General Counsel Opinion of Feb. 26,1990 reprinted in 67 Interp. Rel.
App. I (Apr. 30,1990). On the problem of immigration fraud by attorney
and non-attorney practitioners, see, e.g., Ashbrook, Note, The Unautho-
rized Practice of Law in Immigration: Examining the Propriety of Non-Lawyer
Representation, 5 Geo. J. of Legal Ethics 237 (1991); Leiden, Notice to
Notarios, 14 Immigr. L. J. 37 (1991); Rosenmertz, Note, Attorney Miscon-
duct: An Attempt At Legalization May Lead to Regret, 4 Geo. Immigr. L. J.
63 (1990) and Report of A.B. 4033 Task Force to Calif. Legislature (Feb.
21, 1992)(on file with the author).
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Information and Privacy Act requests. 134 The agency has also
issued instructions on how to process "[riequests from courts
for information regarding the status of a legalization/SAW
application" as well as reports from state agencies seeking to
verify individuals' eligibility for federal entitlement pro-
grams.135
In fact, one top-level INS official belatedly confirmed that
all information in legalization files 136 would be available to
agency employees 137 for uses consistent with the statute. This
would include comparing one-time statements made by an
amnesty applicant against answers given to subsequent ques-
tions in connection with a non-legalization adjustment of sta-
tus.138 If this exception were actually reflected in agency prac-
tice, however, it could swallow the entire rule.
134.These parties include the applicant and her authorized representative.
Policy Statement - Confidentiality of Legalization and Special Agricultural
Worker Records Under [IRCA] (hereafter, Policy Statement - Confidenti-
ality) at V-2 (Oct. 1987) (on file with the author). Also, according to the
INS Legalization Manual, the Service routinely requests that the CIA and
FBI do security checks on applicants. Applications on which "deroga-
tory information" has been received remain in a "wait stage" for 90
days. INS, "Procedures Manual for the Legalization and Special Agri-
cultural Worker Program of the Immigration Reform and Control Act
of 1986" VI-28 to VI-30 (n.d., reprinted by AILA).
135.Policy Statement - Confidentiality, supra, note 134 at VI-2 through VI-4.
136.The one court which has examined intra-agency use of legalization
information did not read the statute so narrowly as to prohibit the
release of information - even to other INS agents - "not obtained
directly from the application itself." Lopez v. Ezell, 716 F.Supp. at 446,
supra, note 16 [emphasis added]. But see, note 138, infra.
137.See dicta in Lopez v. Ezell, 716 F.Supp at 446, supra, note 16, that the
application information not be disclosed to "other departments within
INS."
138. See Letter of Apr. 18,1991 from INS Acting Ass't Comm'r Janet Charney
to Attorney Paul Parsons, reprinted in 68 Interp. Rel. 1573-74, 1597-98
(Nov. 4, 1991). See also, 8 CFR § 245a.3(t)(4)(i)-(ii)(information con-
tained in granted legalization files may be used by INS at later date to
make decision regarding visa petition and naturalization application)
and INS General Counsel, "Legal Opinion," supra, note 131 (allowing
rescission of permanent residence based on legalization application
information). The General Counsel concludes, id., at 4, that rescission of
LPR status is "a determination on an application..." within the meaning
of § 1255a(c)(5)(A) and the application information is therefore not
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Permitting Release of "Redacted" Information
INS has asserted that it could not make available even
those applications where the applicant-identifying informa-
tion has been deleted. 139 Release of "redacted" information
was the central subject of Freedom of Information Act litigation
brought against the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) by a reli-
gious organization which sought a wide variety of tax docu-
ments relating to or containing the name of the church, its
leaders or its philosophy. In Church of Scientology of California v.
IRS, 140 the Supreme Court gave the Internal Revenue Code the
same strict reading it had earlier bestowed on the Census Act.
The Court held that both the wording of the statutory
exception for taxpayer information release and the legislative
history worked against an interpretation that allowed for mere
redaction. Why else, the Court reasoned, would Congress use
a linguistic construction that permits disclosure of data "in a
form" not associated or identified with the taxpayer to describe
information subject to disclosure? A "much more natural phras-
ing" would omit these words and leave open the possibility of
supplying requesters with redacted returns or return informa-
tion.141 In fact, the Court said, the real intent of the exception -
contained in a floor amendment which passed without debate
confidential. Accord, In re Ram P., Aug. 24,1993, Executive Office of
Immigration Review (EOIR), Seattle, and In re Mercedes C., Dec. 1, 1993,
EOIR, Seattle (relying specifically on language in Zambrano, 972 F. 2d,
permitting judicial disclosures) (on file with the author). But see, In re
Peter W. K., EOIR, San Francisco, Nov. 9, 1992 (granting motion to
supress admissibility of legalization-related statements made by re-
spondent who was handcuffed and arrested at local INS office at
completion of legalization interview, on unrelated charges of immigra-
tion fraud) (on file with the author).
139.Zambrano, supra, Def.Open.Brf., Ninth Cir. at 31-32, citing Church of
Scientology of California v. IRS, 484 U.S. 9 (1987) as disfavoring judicial
disclosure.
140.Supra, note 139.
141.Id., at 15. 26 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(2) reads, in relevant part:
"'[R]eturn information' ... does not include data in a form
which cannot be associated with, or otherwise identify, di-
rectly or indirectly, a particular taxpayer."
Section 6103(a), in turn, provides that:
"Returns and return information shall be confidential and
[not] disclose[d] ... in any manner."
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or roll call vote - was to allow the IRS to release statistical
studies and other compilations of data prepared by the agency
or data "not in a form" linked with a particular taxpayer. 142
INS' reliance on Church of Scientology is simply misplaced
in the legalization context. Unlike section 6103(b)(2) of the
Internal Revenue Code, the IRCA confidentiality sections do
not contain language which would prohibit the release of
redacted information from an application, i.e., data which could
not "be associated with or otherwise identify directly or indi-
rectly, a particular [applicant]."'143 The amnesty statute lacks
the very precise construction of the Internal Revenue Code
proviso and, as noted, has a different legislative history.
While the question of redaction was never taken up by the
courts in Zambrano, one district court has found that non-
identifying information and material other than "raw data"
could be produced by the INS.'4 And, in another instance, the
Service stipulated to the release of redacted applications to
plaintiffs' counsel.145
Whether "Open Communication" is Inhibited
Finally, the immigration service argues that the reform
act's confidentiality provisions were intended to "encourage
open communication on the part of aliens" who might fear that
filing a legalization application could facilitate their eventual
deportation, and compares this to government agencies' need
for open communication to freely deliberate about policies or
other action.146 But, this "open communication" is more accu-
rately characterized as Congress' attempt to mitigate "distrust
142. Church of Scientology, 484 U.S. at 16-17. According to the Court, Con-
gress contemplated that the Internal Revenue Service could release a
"reformulation" of the information in a statistical study or "some other
composite product..." Id., at 13, citing appellate decision, 792 F.2d 153,
160 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
143.Internal Revenue Code § 6103(b)(2); 26 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(2).
144.Hernandez II at 9, where the court cautioned against too expansive a
reading of the "gloss" which another agency privilege may be given
under that particular agency's statutory scheme. See also, supra, text
acc. nn. 115-19.
145. United Farm Workers v. INS, Civ. No. S-87-1064 (E.D. Cal.). See text acc.
note 165, infra.
146.Zambrano, supra, Def.Open.Brf., Ninth Cir. at 32-33.
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of authority and lack of understanding among the undocu-
mented population."147 INS has misapplied the government
privilege favoring frank and complete pre-decisional commu-
nication 148 to the monitoring of a court order or the conduct of
discovery, where neither the information to be released nor the
underlying policy disfavoring its release bears any semblance
to the issues in United States v. Weber Aircraft.149
The possible harm to the party who seeks to avoid disclo-
sure is not to be given "talismanic effect.,'150 Indeed, the burden
is on the agency to show that confidentiality is needed to
protect creative debate and discussion or the integrity of the
decision-making process.151
Duty of Plaintiffs' Counsel To Safeguard
Interests Of Absent Class Members
In arguing that IRCA bars any disclosure, the government
has failed to examine the rationale for an order requiring the
release of the list of Zambrano class member names and ad-
147. H.R. Rep. 99-682(I), supra, note 22 at 73 reprinted in U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News at 5677. See, supra, text acc. nn. 54-58.
148.This is the exemption included in the Freedom of Information Act, 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(5), for internal agency memoranda. See e.g., EPA v.
Mink, 410 U.S. 73,87 (1973), for a discussion of the exemption rationale,
based on a recognition that disclosure of advice and comments made by
particular individuals may have a "chilling effect" on the future open-
ness of these individuals. Tax Reform Research Group v. IRS, 419 F.Supp.
415, 423 (D.D.C. 1976).
149.465 U.S. 792 (1984), cited in Zambrano, supra, Def.Open.Brf., Ninth Cir. at
32. In Weber, an aircraft manufacturer sued for personal injury sought
from the United States Air Force, under the Freedom of Information
Act, confidential statements made during an air crash safety investiga-
tion. The Court held that these statements were exempted from disclo-
sure under 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(5) as "intra-agency memorandums or
letters" intended to encourage witnesses to speak frankly for an inves-
tigation designed to prevent future accidents.
150.Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Dep't of Air Force, 402 F.Supp. 460,464 (D.D.C.
1975).
151. See, e.g., Vaughn v. Rosen, 383 F.Supp. 1049,1053 (D.D.C.), affid, 523 F.2d
1136 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("uninhibited discussion") and Sterling Drug, Inc.
v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (protection needed where
disclosure would "infringe upon.. .essential communications...").
CLOAK OF CONFIDENTIALITY 57
dresses. The most obvious is that both the court and opposing
counsel need some mechanism for monitoring compliance
with the injunctive orders, particularly where there is a history
of agency contempt or sanctionable noncompliance. 152
Equally important, providing the list facilitates represen-
tation of those class members who are not named plaintiffs in
the lawsuit. By withholding its release, the immigration service
is in effect asking that the applications be kept from the appli-
cants themselves. It is a cornerstone of class action rules and
case law that the parties before the court, and their attorneys,
must adequately represent the interests of the absent class
members i.e., the unnamed immigrant parents and other would-
be legalization applicants. 153
152.INS was ordered to pay monetary sanctions under a local rule of the
district court for failure to completely implement the court's prelimi-
nary injunction. Zambrano, supra, Order of Jan. 17,1989. The agency was
later held in contempt for failure to adhere to certain provisions of the
stipulated stay order. Order of Dec. 11, 1989. See also note 172, infra, and
briefs in support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce Stay Order, August 11,
1992 and November 20,1992, in the related case of Catholic Social Services
v. Barr, Civ. No. S-86-1343, (E.D. Cal.)(most court documents on file
with Clearinghouse Rev., No. 42,712; this case, sometimes referred to
simply as "CSS," has been variously styled as the Attorneys General
have changed from Edwin Meese to Richard Thornburgh to William
Barr to Acting Attorney General Stuart Gerson to Janet Reno; see, Fed.
R. Civ. P., Rule 25 (d)(1) and Fed. R. App. P. Rule 43 (c)(1)). In the latter
motion to enforce, lawyers for the class of amnesty seekers documented
a host of implementation problems, including INS failure to advise
apprehended class members of their eligibility for legalization, refusal
to approve prima facie applications and the Service's summary revoca-
tion of class membership. Similar problems occurred in monitoring the
Lopez v. Ezell Consent Order of May 1, 1989, Civ. No. S-88-1825 (S.D.
Cal.) (on file with Clearinghouse Rev., No. 44,067) on behalf of the class
member applicants for agricultural worker legalization. See e.g., Let-
ters of July 28,1989, August 16,1989 and April 30,1990 to Parker Carlos
Singh (complaining of INS failure to return confiscated documents to
class members and to identify class members)(on file with author).
153.See, e.g., Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41-43 (1940); Fed. R. Civ.P., Rule
23(a)(4); and discussion in H. Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions §§
15.03, 15.16 (2d ed. 1985).
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In Greenfield v. Villager Industries, Inc.,' 54 the Court of
Appeals described the serious obligations which counsel and
the district court owe the absent class members:
Responsibility for compliance [with procedural rules] is
placed primarily upon the active participants in the law-
suit, especially upon counsel for the class, for... as counsel
to parties to the litigation, class action counsel possess, in
a very real sense, fiduciary obligations to those not before
the court. The ultimate responsibility of course is commit-
ted to the district court in whom, as the guardian of the
rights of the absentees, is vested broad administrative, as
well as adjudicative, power. '5
In addition to "fiduciary," the class counsel's relationship
to individual class members has been described as "construc-
tive attorney-client" or even akin to that of a "private attorney
general." 156 While the precise obligations of lawyers for the
class to absentee class members has not been expressly defined
by the courts, it is clear that "the imperative of protecting
absent class members' interests subjects the relationship of
representative counsel with class members to substantial scru-
tiny by the court... " 157
In the IRCA litigation, the attorney-class member relation-
ship is both enhanced and monitored by the court through an
order to release names of class members to plaintiffs' coun-
sel. 158 Any fear by INS that the release of names of legalization
154.483 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1973).
155.Id., at 832.
156.See, H. Newberg, supra, note 153, § 15.03.
157.Id., at § 15.03.
158.On the lack of contact between attorneys and indigent clients, see
Tremblay, Rebellious Lawyering, Regnant Lawyering, and Street-Level Bu-
reaucracy, 43 Hastings L.J. 947, 949 and writings cited in id., nn. 4-10
(1992) (inadequacies of poverty lawyers in their relations with clients);
Rosenbaum, "Pro Bono Publico Meets Droits de L'Homme: Speaking a
New Legal Language," 13 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 499, 531 and
writings cited in id., nn. 173 and 174 (1991)(charges that Legal Services
lawyers use their clients to advance their own political or social goals);
and Atfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client
Narration, 100 Yale L.J. 2107, 2122-26 (1991) (offices' routinization of
client intake and case review obscures voices of "client struggle.")
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applicants would facilitate the immigrants' deportation is com-
pletely unfounded. There is no reason to suspect the class
counsel or the court of any motive to independently or jointly
sabotage the applicants' claims for residency. Plaintiffs' attor-
neys represent the immigrants' interests; it is defendants' attor-
neys who are the adverse party.159
Lastly, the role of counsel must be viewed against the
backdrop of IRCA's qualified designated entity scheme in
particular and the history of VOLAGS in general. The safe
meeting ground offered by the community-based organiza-
tions, for both the dissemination of information about amnesty
and receipt of materials from would-be beneficiaries, is surely
an indication that Congress would want to foster communica-
tion between bona fide immigration specialists and their po-
tential immigrant clients.
Limiting Access to Disclosed Information
By Protective Order
Finally, if the INS were truly concerned about disclosure of
applicants' names to a third party who might subsequently
facilitate deportation, it could seek a protective order to limit
the use of the names by opposing counsel, to insure that the
names are placed under seal or to otherwise limit access. 160 The
mechanisms, described above, for mitigating applicants' fear
159.Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1194, 1204-05 (9th Cir. 1975). In
Nguyen, the court of appeals reversed a district court order restricting
access by the counsel for a class of airlifted Vietnamese orphans to an ex
parte in camera inspection of random INS files on the children. The
appellate court reasoned that the attorneys represented the children's
interest and needed individual files to determine class eligibility. "While
the [orphans'] claims of illegal detention are presented as a class, it is
individuals among the group who are illegally detained." Id., at 1205
[emphasis added].
160.See, Freeman v. Seligson, 405 F.2d at 1350-51 and text supra, acc. nn. 89-
91; Friedman v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, 738 F.2d at 1344; Rosee v.
Chicago Board of Trade, 35 F.R.D. 512, 515-16 (N.D. Ill. 1964) (under
Commodity Exchange Act prohibition on publication, court can limit
public access to information obtained in discovery by protective order);
and Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d at 1205 (court may issue
protective order to screen out information not necessary to plaintiffs'
lawyers' purposes and otherwise "surround" access to files to guard
against disclosure or abuse of information).
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and suspicion in the United States and other countries which
have conducted legalization programs demonstrate that gov-
ernment agencies are capable of devising ways to protect
sensitive information about immigration status.
In at least two IRCA cases - in which INS' counsel of
record were the same as those who represented the agency and
Attorney General in Zambrano - the confidentiality issue was
resolved by way of unchallenged orders limiting the use of
application documentation. In Catholic Social Services v. Meese,161
the court ordered that documents and evidence, submitted by
legalization applicant class members filing pursuant to a reme-
dial order like the one issued in Zambrano, "not be made public
or used for any purpose unrelated to this litigation by plaintiffs'
counsel. ' 162 In United Farm Workers v. INS,1 63 counsel for the
161.Supra, note 152, Order of June 10, 1988 at 6, appealed on other grounds sub
nora. Catholic Social Services v. Thornburigh, 956 F.2d 914 (1992), vacated
and remanded sub noi. Reno v. Catholic Social Services, 509 U.S. _ supra.
162.Under the stay order of June 10, 1988, 6, plaintiffs' counsel could
conceivably handle documents submitted by prospective applicants
who had been apprehended or who had attempted unsuccessfully to
file. But see, Order Implementing Stay Pending Appeal in Proyecto San
Pablo v. INS (No. 89-456, D. Ariz., Jan. 29,1992). After granting summary
judgment for plaintiffs representing a class of applicants whose con-
tinuous residency was contested by INS (by virtue of an absence
allegedly resulting from a deportation order), 784 F. Supp. 738 (D. Ariz.
1991), the district court ordered interim relief pending appeal to the
Ninth Circuit, including notice to all putative class members of their
right to work authorization. The court did not, however, permit release
of class members' names to plaintiffs. Instead, it adopted the
government's proposed order which admonished INS not to use infor-
mation furnished as to the identity of any applicant for purposes other
than determination of class eligibility and granting relief, Order at 4,
and contained procedures for safeguarding against fraud by appli-
cants. Id., at I 3(a) and (d). In a similar case, the court ordered INS to
provide late-filing legalization applicants with the names and ad-
dresses of plaintiffs' counsel as a means of facilitating contact. Inmigra-
tion Assistance Project v. INS, (C 88-379), Memorandum Decision and
Order Granting Interim Protective Relief at 11 (W.D. Wash., June 1,
1993), stayed on other grounds sub norn. INS v. Legalization Assistance Proj.
See, supra note 65. This order, however, was issued after the Ninth
Circuit decision in Zainbrano. See also nn. 166-68, infra.
163.Supra, note 145.
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immigration service 164 stipulated to a protective order to avoid
any possible violation of §1160(b)(6) - the parallel confidenti-
ality section for agricultural worker legalization applicants.
Redacted notices of denial issued by INS administrative units
were provided to plaintiffs' counsel and, perhaps more sur-
prising, INS attorneys were given access to the application files
of plaintiffs.165
Similarly, the government acquiesced to a provision in the
Hernandez v. Thornburgh consent decree that it turn over re-
dacted denial letters and other notices issued to applicants 166
and to a stipulated stay order in the Second Circuit analogue to
Zambrano167 to disclose the names of legalization applicants to
opposing counsel. These orders were intended to assist plain-
tiffs' counsel in monitoring INS review of claims from appli-
cants initially prevented from filing applications because the
agency said they did not meet eligibility requirements.
Rather than stay its order that the names be released to
counsel as INS had requested, the Zambrano district court
issued a protective order sua sponte, requiring the filing of
names under seal and admonishing plaintiffs' attorneys re-
garding any use of the names inconsistent with their role as
class counsel. 168
164.Two of the INS attorneys were also counsel of record in Zambrano v. INS.
See, generally, United Farm Workers, supra, note 145, and Zambrano
pleadings (on file with Clearinghouse Rev., Nos. 42,723 and 43,351,
respectively).
165.The exchange followed contested discovery requests by both parties.
United Farm Workers v. INS, supra, note 145, Reporter's Transcript of
Nov. 23,1988 at 1-2 (on file with the author). See also, text supra, acc. nn.
139-45.
166.Hernandez v. Thornburgh, supra, note 14, Stipulation of Settlement and
Order at 3-4 (Feb. 22, 1991)(INS to provide plaintiffs' counsel with the
status of applicants where continuous residence was contested as well
as copies of redacted decision letters and denial notices). No class was
certified in this case. See, supra, note 113.
167.Perales v. Thornburgh, supra, note 57, Stipulation and Order of Nov. 13,
1992 (2d Cir. Nos. 91-6133, -6135, -6167), 2(b),(e) (government
stipulated to giving names and addresses of legalization applicants to
class counsel on condition that they be kept confidential). This occurred
after the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court in Zambrano.
168.Slip Op. at 7-8. Even the protective order was not enough to deter INS
from appealing to the Ninth Circuit; plaintiffs' lawyers were obliged for
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Conclusion
The Ninth Circuit did uphold the district court order in an
opinion which adopts much of plaintiffs' analysis, but in abbre-
viated form. The Court of Appeals had little problem distin-
guishing Baldridge, relying on the Nelson precedent and its own
articulation that the Census Act's express prohibition against
production in judicial proceedings was simply not adopted in
IRCA. 1
6 9
Ultimately, the appellate court followed the Eleventh Cir-
cuit 170 holding and examined precisely whose interests were to
be protected by the statute - the immigrant applicants - and
whether those interests would be served by disclosure. The
panel decided they would be. In other words, the release of
names "facilitates, rather than frustrates" the intent of the
immigration reform act,171 according to the court. The govern-
ment did not appeal the confidentiality issue to the Supreme
Court. 172
Meanwhile, the parties, in at least two other cases chal-
lenging implementation of the IRCA eligibility requirements,
had earlier reached settlements where they devised compli-
strategic reasons to agree to stay this amended disclosure provision as
well. Stipulation and Order of August 15, 1989, supra, note 79 at 5-6.
169.Zambrano, 972 F.2d at 1125, relying on St. Regis, 368 U.S. and Freeman v.
Seligson, 405 F.2d.
170.The court said it was also following the District of Columbia Circuit in
holding that there was no violation of 1255a(c)(5). However, the D.C.
Circuit had only reviewed an analogous confidentiality clause in the
Commodity Exchange Act. See, Freeman v. Seligson, 405 F.2d and text
supra, acc. nn. 89-91.
171.Zambrano, 972 F2d at 1126, quoting the district court. The Ninth Circuit
also agreed with the lower court that this is not a confidentiality statute
so much as a ban on disclosure. The provision is really a prohibition
"against the use of the information by the government to prosecute,
deport or otherwise penalize" undocumented immigrants. Id. [empha-
sis added].
172.INS v. Zambrano, Brief In Support of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, No.
92-849 (Nov. 1992). On November 10,1992, the mandate issued from the
Ninth Circuit. Plaintiffs' lawyers have since asked INS to release the
names of class members, with no success to date. See, plaintiffs' briefs
in support of Motion for Contempt, Sanctions and for Further Compli-
ance (June 25, 1993 & July 16, 1993).
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ance monitoring procedures explicitly tied to the fate of
Zambrano in the Court of Appeals. That is, plaintiffs' lawyers
intended to examine copies of denial notices issued to appli-
cants for temporary residency under the special agricultural
worker program, 173 but were constrained from negotiating for
release of the names until the matter was resolved in the related
Zambrano appeal.174
The victory in Zambrano may be too little, too late at this
juncture to aid in monitoring agency compliance in the other
IRCA settlements.175 Nonetheless, the appellate court's affir-
mance is a signal to the immigration service that its absolutist
construction of a statute does more to resist than assist the will
of Congress. If the INS really cares about promoting public
participation in immigration benefits and open communica-
tion in the application process, it will match its words about
protecting immigrants' interests with its deeds.
173.See, United Farm Workers v. INS, supra, note 145, Stipulation of Settle-
ment and Order Pursuant Thereto, April 21,1989, I V(j) (INS to furnish
class counsel with statistics on readjudicated applications for SAW
status with the option to renegotiate the release of actual denial notices
pending the Zambrano appeal), reprinted in 66 Interp. Rel. 470 (April 24,
1989). See also, Lopez v. Ezell, Consent Order of May 1, 1989, 9, supra,
note 152. (same provision with regard to SAW applicants whose interim
work authorization and stays of deportation had been confiscated and
legalization claims denied).
174.The parties surely did not contemplate the hiatus between the district
court and appellate rulings. See supra, note 80.
175.But see, Stipulation and Order Thereon of Mar. 4, 1993, Catholic Social
Services v. Gerson, supra, note 152, Exhibit A, at 7-8 reprinted in 70 Interp.
Rel. 297,300 (Mar. 8,1993). (INS agreed to give class counsel the names
of applicants denied class status and those whose status it revoked).
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